Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information  Flows by Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Stephanie W.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
SPECULATIVE OVERPRICING IN ASSET MARKETS WITH
INFORMATION FLOWS
Thomas R. Palfrey
California Institute of Technology
Stephanie W. Wang
University of Pittsburgh
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1309
August 2009
Revised January 2012
Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with
Information Flows1
Thomas R. Palfrey2 and Stephanie W. Wang3
January 19, 2012
1We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-
0617820), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Social Science Experimental Laboratory
at Caltech, and the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory at UCLA. We are grateful
for comments from Peter Bossaerts, Ron Harstad, Tony Kwasnica, Stephen Morris, Howard
Rosenthal, three referees, a co-editor, and participants at numerous seminars and conferences.
2Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125.
trp@hss.caltech.edu
3Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.
swwang@pitt.edu
Abstract
In this paper, we derive and experimentally test a theoretical model of speculation in
multi-period asset markets with public information flows. The speculation arises from
the traders’ heterogeneous posteriors as they make different inferences from sequences of
public information. This leads to overpricing in the sense that price exceeds the most opti-
mistic belief about the real value of the asset. We find evidence of speculative overpricing
in both incomplete and complete markets, where the information flow is a gradually re-
vealed sequence of imperfect public signals about the state of the world. We also find
evidence of asymmetric price reaction to good news and bad news, another feature of equi-
librium price dynamics under our model. Markets with a relaxed short-sale constraint
exhibit less overpricing.
1 Introduction
This paper studies equilibrium pricing dynamics in a simple dynamic asset market where
traders have heterogeneous beliefs and face the short-sale constraint. We analyze a model
that follows from a long line of theoretical research initiated by Harrison and Kreps
(HK, 1978). That line of research has had a major impact in the theoretical finance
literature, so it is surprising that there have been no attempts to directly observe one of
the central implications of the theory, what we refer to as speculative overpricing. By
speculative overpricing, we refer to the phenomenon where the current price of an asset
exceeds the maximum amount any trader is willing to pay if he/she has to hold the asset
to maturity (overpricing). Traders are willing to ”overpay” in equilibrium because they
believe (correctly) that in equilibrium there is a chance another trader will value the asset
more highly than they do at some future date. The key insight of the seminal HK paper
is that speculative overpricing of a multi-period asset can arise in equilibrium if there is
a combination of the short-sale constraint and divergent beliefs about the fundamentals
determining the underlying value of the asset. We report the results of a laboratory
study that implements the main features of such asset markets. The transactions data
from these markets are then used to test the speculative overpricing hypothesis as well as
several other testable implications of the model.
The model is by design a simple one, simple enough to study easily in the laboratory
using the standard multiple-unit open-book continuous double-auction market. We as-
sume a finite horizon, two equally likely states of the world, A and B, and a single asset,
a simple Arrow-Debreu security that yields a payoff of 1 in state A and of 0 in state B.
As with most of the literature following HK, traders are assumed to be risk neutral. In
each time period, a new public information signal arrives at the market that is observed
by all traders. Signals are binary and i.i.d., conditional on the state. The source of belief
heterogeneity is motivated by well-documented heterogeneity in how individuals update
prior beliefs after receiving a signal that is correlated with the state of the world.1 Specif-
ically, some individuals over-react to signals in the sense of updating their prior beliefs
more sharply than would a Bayesian, while other individuals under-react in the sense of
updating their prior more conservatively than would a Bayesian. If the traders are drawn
from a pool of over-reacters and under-reacters, then the posterior beliefs of traders can
differ even after observing the same sequence of public signals.
Together, the short-sale constraint and heterogeneous beliefs result in higher equi-
1Laboratory choice studies by economists and psychologists have consistently found a range of vio-
lations of Bayes’ rule. For example, the study by El-Gamal and Grether (1999) classifies subjects into
categories analogous to over-reacters and under-reacters.
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librium prices than in the case where all traders are Bayesians who correctly perceive
the informativeness of the signals (Bayesian pricing). There are two separate forces that
produce this overpricing. The first is simply belief heterogeneity: the highest valuation
trader will be an over-reacter if there has been more good than bad news and will be an
under-reacter if the sequence of signals has more bad than good news. In either case, this
highest valuation exceeds the valuation based on the correct Bayesian posterior on state
A. The second source of overpricing is speculation. The equilibrium price will generally
exceed the valuation of the the most optimistic trader, because he/she believes in the
possibility of a future sequence of public signals that would lead some other trader to be
the most optimistic, at which point trade would occur and the currently most optimistic
trader would cash out at a profit. We call the difference between the current equilibrium
price and the maximum current valuation the speculative premium. The speculative pre-
mium is positive as long as it is still possible for the set of most optimistic traders to
change at some future date.2
Another implication of our model concerns the trajectory of prices: asymmetric re-
action to good and bad news. Because price responses are dampened when the marginal
traders are under-reacters and exaggerated when the marginal traders are over-reacters,
the difference between the price and .5 is generally greater when there are more signals
communicating good news versus bad news than when there is more bad news than good
news.
To test the pricing predictions derived from our model, we run laboratory-controlled
asset markets where asset returns are contingent upon a binary state of the world, and
the information flows consist of a sequence of 10 informative public signals. In these
markets, all traders are informed that the prior on state A is .5 and are provided with
the conditional distribution of public signals given the state of the world. In one infor-
mation treatment, the signals are highly informative whereas signals are less informative
in the other treatment. We impose the short-sale constraint and endow our traders with
adequate liquidity so liquidity constraints do not bind.
We find persistent and significant overpricing. That is, in both information treat-
ments we find pricing of the assets that is above the baseline of Bayesian updating to
homogeneous posteriors. We also find that trading prices under-react to bad news com-
pared to the reaction to good news, as implied by the model. We estimate a parametric
model of the distribution of trader belief types, which allows us to test for heterogeneity
of beliefs and also to back out estimates of the speculative premium. We find that the
estimated speculative premiums are generally positive in those periods where the theory
2One can think of the speculative premium as representing a fair-odds bet by the currently most
optimistic trader that he will profitably sell to a more optimistic trader at some later date.
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predicts it.
To dig more deeply into the overpricing phenomenon and to identify the extent to
which it depends on the short-sale constraint, we run two additional variations on the
simple one-market setup. In one variation, which we call the complete markets treatment
we open a second, complementary Arrow-Debreu security market that pays 1 in state B
and 0 in state A. Traders are endowed with both assets and trading occurs simultaneously
in both markets. Thus, good news for the A market is bad news for the B market, and
vice versa. This has several implications. The first is that the existence of overpricing
is very easy to identify, because it is implied whenever the sum of the prices in the two
markets exceeds 1. Second, while short sales are still disallowed, if prices add to more than
1, there are some (limited) arbitrage opportunities, since any trader is able to sell one unit
of each asset and make a sure profit. We still find overpricing in these complete markets
with limited arbitrage. In our final treatment, which we call the short sales treatment, we
continue to have both assets, but now allow short sales by permitting traders to buy from
the experimenter unlimited units of a risk-free ”bundled” asset, consisting of one unit of
the A asset and one unit of the B asset, for a price of 1. To keep trading as simple a task
as possible, we only allow market transactions in the A asset. However, this means that if
the price of the A asset is higher than a trader’s valuation, that trader can buy a risk-free
asset bundle and then sell the A unit of the bundle (retaining the B unit), generating
an expected profit. Thus, this treatment relaxes the short-sale constraint. We find lower
prices in the short sale treatment that are significantly closer to the homogeneous-belief
Bayesian pricing in either the baseline or the complete markets treatment.
Section 2 gives some background and discusses some of the related literature. The
model and the theoretical results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the ex-
perimental design and procedures. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
with a summary of findings and suggestions for future work.
2 Background and discussion of related literature
2.1 Asset pricing experiments
There are three relevant classes of asset pricing experiments that provide a useful back-
ground and contrast with the experiment presented in this paper. First, there are a
number of published multi-period asset experiments that were designed to test rational
expectations equilibrium with no uncertainty, where the asset paid off certain dividends
in each period and perfect foresight pricing was easily calculated. These date back to the
initial study by Forsythe et al. (FPP, 1982). There is a connection with this paper, in that
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the pricing was determined by a very simple recursive calculation starting from the last
period, and equilibrium had the property that in each period the price was determined
by exactly one trader type who values the asset the highest. Forsythe et al. made two
key findings in that experiment, which have been successfully replicated with a number of
variations (Forsythe et al., 1984; Friedman et al., 1984). First, prices converged over time
toward the rational expectations prices. Second, prices always converged from below ; that
is, prices never exceeded the rational expectations prices. No speculative premium was
ever observed. The current experiment differs from these earlier experiments by introduc-
ing state uncertainty, sequential public information signals and Arrow-Debreu securities
that pay off only in the last period.
A second class of asset pricing experiments, initiated by Plott and Sunder (1982,
1988) and reviewed in Sunder (1995), explicitly focuses on the questions of whether and
under what conditions state-contingent claims markets successfully aggregate private in-
formation in static markets; i.e., rational expectations equilibrium in the sense of Radner
(1979) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Traders are endowed with private information
at time 0, the market opens and clears at time 1, and, in theory, private information
is fully revealed by the equilibrium price as if it had been public information from the
start. Those experiments focus on questions about aggregation of private information
and the conditions under which transaction prices converge to the fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium. More recent studies have dug deeper into questions about why
standard predictions about price response to information (Asparouhova et al. 2009) and
the distribution of asset holdings (Bossaerts et al. 2007) may fail. In contrast to the
present paper, these approaches are based on the standard capital asset pricing model
and explore the role of heterogeneity in attitudes towards risk and ambiguity, while our
approach centers around heterogeneous beliefs.
The third class of experiments are the ”bubble experiments” initiated by Smith et
al. (1988). Like the first class, these are multi-period asset markets where the assets
generate a stream of dividends. The dividends in each period are i.i.d. draws from a
known distribution. Thus, unlike our model, realizations of the outcomes in each period
provide no information about the future value of the asset. Rather, the expected value
of the asset is known at all points in time so there is no possibility for heterogeneous
beliefs. Since dividends accrue each period, the fundamental asset value declines over
time. Consequently, the equilibrium price dynamics for such markets are completely
different from markets that share the properties of our model. In fact, if all traders are
risk neutral, equilibrium prices simply decline linearly to zero over time. If there are T
periods remaining, the asset’s value is simply equal to T times the expected per-period
dividend of the asset.
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Indeed, the observed price dynamics in these bubble experiments are completely dif-
ferent from the equilibrium price dynamics in our model. The pricing more closely resem-
bles the original FPP experiment. In early periods, transaction prices are significantly
below the equilibrium price as if there is a negative speculative premium. Because the
equilibrium price declines over time while the price adjustment process drives the below-
equilibrium prices upward, the transaction prices eventually catch up with equilibrium
prices. When that happens, the price adjustment stops, and level out. However, the equi-
librium price continues to fall. This results in a situation where prices exceed fundamental
value - a bubble. The surprising observation in these experiments is that transaction prices
often remain approximately constant for a while even though the fundamental value is
declining. Volume declines as well, and then the price collapses to its fundamental value
at or near the time the terminal period when the asset expires. This is obviously not
an equilibrium phenomenon, at least within the class of models that motivated those
experiments or the class of models considered here. A second finding from those experi-
ments that mirrors the FPP class of experiments is that the disequilibrium pricing (both
the underpricing in early periods and the overpricing in middle-to-later periods) dimin-
ishes with experience, leading to convergence in the direction of the rational expectations
equilibrium. Also noteworthy is that equilibrium pricing in the basic bubble experiment
doesn’t depend on factors such as short sales or liquidity constraints, trader heterogeneity,
complete markets, and so forth. In fact, researchers have run many variations including
futures markets and other types of market organization which generally lead to similar
conclusions. In one variation particularly relevant to the present paper (Porter and Smith,
2003), short sales are allowed, and the bubble phenomenon persists, and if anything is
even more pronounced.
2.2 Theories of speculative trade in asset markets
Models in the finance literature have analyzed the impact of speculative trading due to
heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices when no short-sale is allowed. Biais and Bossaerts
(1998) consider several types of heterogeneity in beliefs, such as common knowledge about
the belief formation rules only and derive the implied speculative value of the assets under
each type. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) find speculative bubbles with high volume and
volatility in their model of differences in beliefs due to overconfidence. Our model is
closest to the one studied in Harris and Raviv (1993), in which they look at heterogeneity
of beliefs in a model with a continuum of public signals, but some traders have market
power so prices are not determined competitively. Like Scheinkman and Xiong, they focus
on the relationship between trading volume and price volatility.
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Morris (1996) builds a dynamic version of the HK speculative trading model to show
that small differences in prior beliefs can lead to a significant speculative premium. In
the HK model, the heterogeneity of expectations regarding others’ beliefs that drove
the speculative buying in anticipation of reselling was taken as given. Morris models this
heterogeneity as initial differences in beliefs regarding the fundamental value of the asset so
that as beliefs converge over time to the true probability, the speculative premium falls to
zero as well. He also formalizes Miller’s (1977) claim that the most optimistic trader would
hold all the assets, assuming sufficient liquidity, and that the most optimistic valuation
would drive the equilibrium pricing. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2007) analyze the REE
price dynamics in a binary prediction market where traders have heterogeneous priors
and private information. They find that the prices actually under-react to information
under the assumption that traders are liquidity-constrained or risk averse. They also
find that more information provided over time corrects this initial under-reaction so that
the price approaches the Bayesian posterior. Finally, Asparouhova et al. (2009) explore
the implications of a different kind of behavioral bias in beliefs by studying asset market
equilibria with ambiguity averse traders.
Our model builds on these ideas about speculation and belief heterogeneity and main-
tains the institutional assumptions of sufficient liquidity, risk neutrality, and short-sale
constraint. However, we depart from the assumption of heterogeneous priors and updat-
ing about the probability of future dividends based on the history of dividends because
ours is a model of an asset that pays off only at the end of the market based on the state
of the world. Instead traders in our model, who have a homogeneous prior, observe a se-
quence of public signals over the life of the asset, but draw different inferences about the
state of the world from this information, which leads to heterogeneous posterior beliefs.
3 The Model
Nature chooses the state of the world, $ ∈ {A,B}, where the probability of A is p ∈ (0, 1).
There is an asset market with T + 1 trading periods, t = {0, 1, 2, ...T} and I risk-neutral
traders, i = {1, 2, ..., I}. There is one type of asset in this market. Each unit a trader
holds at the end of period T pays off 1 if A is the state of the world and 0 if the state
of the world is B. There are no intermediate direct returns from holding the asset in
periods 0, ..., T − 1. Traders observe a sequence of public signals, s = {s1, ..., sT}, where
st denotes the signal observed at the beginning of trading period t. There are two sources
of earnings in these markets: trading profits or losses from transactions made during the
market and the one-time state-dependent payoff for the final asset holdings at the end of
the market. Each trader is initially endowed with xi units of this risky asset and yi units
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of a safe asset that pays 1 in both states of the world (“cash”). We assume traders are
risk neutral, so if trader i’s final allocation of the risky asset is xiT , and final allocation of
cash is yiT , then i’s utility is E
i = yiT + x
i
T IA where IA = 1 in state A and IA = 0 in state
B.
Signals are binary, with st ∈ {a, b}, and are generated by a symmetric stochastic
process that is independent and identically distributed across periods, conditional on the
state.3 Conditional on $ = A, then st = a with probability q > 0.5 and st = b with
probability 1 − q. Conditional on $ = B, st = b with probability q > 0.5 and st = a
with probability 1 − q. In the initial trading period, traders have no information about
the state of the world except the prior p0. Since the asset pays off only in state A, we
sometimes refer to the asset as asset A and sometimes refer to a signal st = a as Good
News and a signal st = b as Bad News.
3.1 Equilibrium Prices with Bayesian Traders
First, suppose that all traders are Bayesians and use a common Bayesian updating rule,
based on the “true” stochastic process generating the signals. That is, q is common
knowledge and all traders update using Bayes rule. Let ρt be the common belief that
the state of the world is A, given the history of signals {s1, s2, ..., st}. Note that ρ0 = p
because no information has yet been revealed. Given ρt, the common posterior at t+ 1 if
st+1 = a is
ρ
st+1=a
t+1 =
qρt
qρt + (1− q)(1− ρt) (1)
and the common posterior at t+ 1 if st = b is
ρ
st+1=b
t+1 =
(1− q)ρt
(1− q)ρt + q(1− ρt) (2)
Given that the asset pays off 1 in state A and 0 in state B, and given that all agents
are symmetric and risk neutral, this common posterior is also the valuation of the asset.
This is the Bayesian equilibrium price of the asset after any history.
3.2 Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Beliefs
This section contains a theory of pricing in the asset A market if traders have heteroge-
neous beliefs of a particular kind. As in the HK models, the traders agree to disagree.
3Most of the theoretical results hold for more general signal structures. Assumptions such as a binary
signal space, independence, symmetry and identical distributions over time are used for simplicity of
exposition and to keep the theoretical model as close as possible to the experimental implementation.
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At every point in time, each trader thinks his own belief is absolutely correct. Traders
have rational expectations about the distribution of future prices, in the sense that they
agree on the mapping from sequences of signals to the equilibrium price, and disagree
only about the fundamental value of the asset.
The traders could have subjective priors and start out with different homegrown prior
beliefs pi0 that the state is A. However, since we state clearly to the traders that states A
and B are equally likely in the instructions, this type of belief heterogeneity is unlikely.
We focus on a model where different traders have different perceptions about the
informativeness of each signal. In this case, traders start in period 0 with the common
prior, p0, but each trader has his own personal estimate, q
i, of the informativeness of the
signal. These qi’s could differ from the objective q of the signal.
This subjective updating leads to heterogeneity in the degree to which different traders
will update their belief about the state of the world in response to identical sequences
of signals. Specifically, it is possible that some traders over-react to news, and other
traders under-react to news (relative to how a Bayesian with qi = q updates).4 Past
experiments (e.g. Anderson and Sunder 1995; Goeree et al. 2007; El-Gamal and Grether
1995) have found evidence of this kind of judgment bias, including heterogeneity. Over-
reaction to the signals is sometimes referred to as base-rate neglect or a base-rate fallacy,
and under-reaction is sometimes referred to as conservatism (Camerer 2003).
3.2.1 Trader Types with Subjective Updating Heterogeneity
Consider possible trader types characterized by the parameter θ ∈ [0,∞]. A trader with
type θi will treat a single signal as if it had the informational equivalent of θ independent
signals, each of informativeness q. Thus. θi measures how much trader i under-reacts
(θi < 1) or overreacts (θi > 1) to the signal relative to q.
Let ρit denote trader i’s belief at the beginning of period t that the state of the world
is A given some history of public signals {s1, s2, ..., st}. Since traders share a common
prior when no information has yet been revealed, pi0 = p for all i ∈ I. Given ρit, trader
i’s updated posterior after observing st+1 = a if i is type θi equals:
ρ
st+1=a
it+1 (θi) =
qθiρit
qθiρit + (1− q)θi(1− ρit) (3)
and after observing st+1 = b equals:
ρ
st+1=b
it+1 (θi) =
(1− q)θiρit
(1− q)θiρit + qθi(1− ρit) (4)
4This also implies that traders differ in their expectations about future signals.
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We refer to traders with 0 ≤ θ < 1 as Skeptical types. At one extreme is the
θ = 0 type. Traders of this type believe that the signals are just noise, as if the signal
distribution were independent of the state. They do not update their prior after either
signal a or signal b. Such a type’s probabilistic belief that A is the state of the world
remains unchanged for any sequence of signals. That is,
ρ
st+1=a
it+1 (0) = p ∀t, s1, ..., st
We refer to traders with θ = 1 as the Bayesian type. Traders of this type believe
they are receiving signals of strength q, so their posterior probabilities are equivalent to
those of a Bayesian.
ρ
st+1=a
it+1 (1) =
qρit
qρit + (1− q)(1− ρit)
We refer to θ > 1 as Gullible types. Traders of this type update as if the informa-
tiveness of signals is higher than q. For extremely high values of θ, fickle traders treat a
signal as nearly a full revelation of the state. For example, if p = .5, q = .7 and θi = 10,
then, after the first signal, if s1 = a, trader i’s posterior is
ρs1=ai1 (10) =
.710
.710 + .310
= .9998
This does not imply that gullible types’ beliefs move immediately to 0 or 1 and stay
there. In fact, exactly the opposite is the case. In the above example, if s2 = b, then i’s
beliefs go back to ρs1=a,s2=bi2 = .5, and then if s3 = b again, the trader’s belief would be
ρs1=a,s2=b,s3=bi3 = .0002. Thus, gullible types have relatively volatile beliefs while skeptical
types have relatively sticky beliefs.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Prices
We maintain the assumptions of no short-sale (implemented in the experimental design)
and sufficient liquidity so that any trader can hold all units of the risky asset for any
price less than or equal to 1. Under these assumptions, we can apply arguments similar
to those used to solve the HK model and characterize the equilibrium price dynamics in
our model.
For the remainder of the paper we will assume p = 0.5.5 For any fixed p, the updating
process depends only on q, the number of a signals, which we denote by α, and the number
of b signals, which we denote by β ≡ t − α. Hence, in the baseline case of homogeneous
5The model extends in a straightforward way to the more general case of p 6= .5.
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Bayesian beliefs, (θi = 1 ∀i), the equilibrium price of the asset at period t, PBt , following
any history in which the number of a signals is α equals:
PBt = ρt =
qα(1− q)t−α
qα(1− q)t−α + qt−α(1− q)α
Given the way we have defined our different trader types, a trader’s posterior beliefs
will depend only on the trader’s type, q, and the difference between the number of good
news signals and bad news signals, δ = α − β. Specifically, the current belief of trader
type θi can be expressed as:
ραit(θi) =
qθiα(1− q)θi(t−α)
qθiα(1− q)θi(t−α) + qθi(t−α)(1− q)θiα
=
1
1 + (1−q
q
)θiδ
Define ρt(α) = max
i∈I
{ραit(θi)} to be the most optimistic belief among the traders in
period t about A being the state of the world and define θ∗t = arg max
i∈I
{ραit(θi)}. That is,
ρt(α) = ρ
α
it(θ
∗
t ). The equilibrium price of the asset at period t given the number of a signals,
Pt(α), must be equal to the highest expected return of holding it to the next period. If the
price is strictly lower than the highest expected return, then the trader(s) with the highest
expected return would demand infinite units of the asset and the market would not clear.
On the other hand, if the price is strictly higher than the highest expected return, then
the demand for the asset would be zero and that price cannot be the equilibrium price.
Let ϕt(α) denote the most optimistic belief about the probability of an st+1 = a after
α a signals up to period t. Then:
ϕt(α) = ρt(α)(
qθ
∗
t
qθ
∗
t + (1− q)θ∗t ) + (1− ρt(α))(
(1− q)θ∗t
qθ
∗
t + (1− q)θ∗t ) (5)
Note that this is not equivalent to the most optimistic belief about A being the state
of the world because $ = A does not necessarily mean st+1 = a. Traders can update
their beliefs and asset valuations based only on the sequence of revealed signals so pricing
depends upon the revealed signals and the traders’ expectations about future signals. The
θ type with the most optimistic belief about the state of the world being A also has the
most optimistic belief about the next signal being a.6 Now we can specify the equilibrium
price
Pt(α) = ϕt(α)Pt+1(α + 1) + (1− ϕt(α))Pt+1(α) (6)
6This follows because θ∗t = min
i∈I
{θi} when ρt(α) < 0.5 and θ∗t = max
i∈I
{θi} when ρt(α) > 0.5.
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The first term on the RHS is equal to most optimistic belief about an a signal being
revealed next period multiplied by the price next period if st+1 = a. The second term is
equal to the corresponding belief that a b signal will be revealed next period multiplied
by the price next period if st+1 = b.
In the last period, period T , the price is equal to the highest posterior belief among
all traders that the state is A:
PT (α) = ρT (α) (7)
The equilibrium pricing scheme is uniquely pinned down by equations (6) and (7)
because we can now solve backwards for the equilibrium price at every period. Note
that our model and this specification of the equilibrium price dynamics departs from the
original HK and Morris models in two specific ways. First, while they look at a finite
truncation of an infinite market, we analyze a market with T <∞ periods. Because of our
finite horizon, we can immediately rule out other possible pricing trajectories involving
bubbles or Ponzi schemes that Harrison and Kreps and Morris consider. Second, while
their model introduces uncertainty as to whether the asset will pay a dividend after
each period, the asset that we analyze pays off only at the end of the market after
T periods. Thus, in their analysis, the price dynamics and speculative premiums are
driven by heterogeneous beliefs about dividend payoffs in future periods based on the
past dividend stream. In our analysis, the price dynamics and speculative premiums are
driven by heterogeneous updating of beliefs about the state of the world that determines
final asset payoff.
3.3 Speculative Premium
The above analysis shows that equilibrium prices in a market where traders have hetero-
geneous beliefs will typically be different from equilibrium prices if all traders are Bayesian
(θ = 1). The difference between equilibrium prices in our model and Bayesian pricing
arises for two different reasons. At any point in time, trader k’s willingness to pay for
the asset has two separate components: (a) a valuation component based on trader k’s
current hold-to-maturity valuation; and (b) a speculative premium component that exists
if there is some probability that trader k can resell the asset at some future date following
a sequence of public signals that leads another trader to have a higher hold-to-maturity
valuation than trader k.
Consider first how the valuation component affects prices when there are heteroge-
neous beliefs, in the sense that traders with different θs will have different hold-to-maturity
valuations of the asset. Trader k’s valuation in period t given α, ρkt(α), is simply his/her
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posterior belief that the state is A which depends on θk. Any trader k is willing to pay
at least his hold-to-maturity valuation, ρkt(α), and therefore the equilibrium price must
be at least equal to ρt(α) = max
i∈I
{ραit(θi)}. In states where α > β, ρt(α) = ραit(θmax), and
in states where α < β, ρt(α) = ρ
α
it(θmin) Therefore, if θ < 1 for some traders and θ > 1
for other traders, as choice experiments have indicated, then this implies that equilibrium
prices must exceed Bayesian prices, at least for all α 6= 0.7
Consider next how the speculative premium component, the difference between the
current equilibrium price and the current maximum hold-to-maturity valuation among
all traders, affects prices when there are heterogeneous beliefs. That is, we define the
speculative premium by pit(α) = Pt(α) − ρt(α). Following Morris (1996), we give two
definitions of an optimistic trader (i.e., a trader with the maximum hold-to-maturity
valuation).
Definition 1 Trader k is a current optimist at t if ρkt(α) = ρt(α).
Definition 2 Trader k is a permanent optimist at t if ρkt′(α
′) = ρt′(α
′) for all
t′ = t+ 1, ..., T and for all α′ = α, α + 1, ..., α + t′ − t.
In words, a permanent optimist at t not only has the (weakly) most optimistic belief
among all traders at t that A is the state of the world, but will also continue to be an
optimist for all possible sequences of future signals. The speculative premium can be
calculated recursively by:
pit(α) ≡ ϕt(α)[pit+1(α + 1) + ρt+1(α + 1)] + (1− ϕt(α))[pit+1(α) + ρt+1(α)]− ρt(α)
It is straightforward to prove that pit(α) ≥ 0 for all t = 0, ..., T and for all α = 0, 1, ..., t.
The following result shows that the speculative premium is strictly positive if and only if
there is no permanent optimist.
Proposition 1 (i) If |δ| < T − t, then no trader is a permanent optimist and Pt(α) >
ρit(α) ∀i, and pit(α) > 0
(ii) If |δ| ≥ T − t, then there is a permanent optimist, and pit(α) = 0
Proof. See Appendix A.
In our experimental setup, there are 10 signals released in each market so T = 10. In
this case, the condition for a positive speculative premium stated in Part (i) of Proposition
1 simplifies to α < 5 and β < 5. With fewer than 5 pieces each of both good and bad
news, there is always the possibility of enough additional pieces of either good or bad
news before the end of the market such that the current optimist at period α + β = t
will no longer the optimist. However, if α is greater than or equal to 5, this is no longer
7In our model, ρkt(α) = 0.5 for all traders if α = β.
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possible. The θmax trader(s) is the permanent optimist because there will always be at
least as many pieces of good news as there are bad news regardless of future pieces of
information. Similarly, if β is equal to or greater than 5, then the θmin trader(s) is the
permanent optimist. The permanent optimist(s) will continue to hold the assets until the
end of the market so there is no speculative premium once a permanent optimist exists.
3.4 Asymmetric Response to Good versus Bad News
We also compare by how much the price at time t differs from the flat prior p = 0.5 when
α pieces of Good News have been revealed versus when t− α pieces of Good News have
been revealed. An implication of our model is that equilibrium prices react more to pieces
of Good News than pieces of Bad News.
Proposition 2 1− Pt(α) < Pt(t− α) ∀α > t2
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.5 Horizon Effect
Next we explore another pattern of the speculative premiums: the horizon effect. As
the number of periods until the end of the market decreases, the speculative premium is
non-increasing. The first part of this horizon effect follows directly from Proposition 1: if
a sufficiently large number of Good or Bad News signals have been revealed (|δ| ≥ T − t),
then the speculative premium, pit(α), will equal zero for all subsequent periods. This is
true because with enough pieces of either good news or bad news, relative to the number
of periods remaining, there is no possibility that the most optimistic trader will change,
no matter how many pieces of good news or bad news follow.
The second part of the horizon effect is that in periods where |δ| < T − t, the
speculative premium is non-decreasing in the horizon for fixed δ. With fewer trading
periods left in the market, the probability of δ switching between positive and negative
also decreases; therefore, the speculative premium cannot increase.
Proposition 3 pit(α) ≤ pit−2(α− 1) ∀T ≥ t > 1 and α < t
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that since t = α+β the value of δ is the same at histories (α, t) and (α−1, t−2).
Thus the proposition states that the speculative premium is (weakly) higher in earlier
periods, holding δ = α− β constant.
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4 Experimental Design and Procedures
We began our experimental analysis by conducting six sessions of a one-asset trading
market, which we refer to as the baseline sessions, with a total of 68 individual traders
The traders were registered Caltech students who were recruited by e-mail solicitation.
Sessions were conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory at Caltech. In-
structions were read out loud and screen displays were explained using a Powerpoint slide
show in front of the laboratory at the beginning of each session. All interactions during
the sessions took place through the computer interface. The trading interface used the
open source software package Multistage Games8.
In each market of a session, a coin is flipped before the market opens to determine
the state of the world: either State A (heads) or State B (tails). The result of the coin-flip
is not announced until the market closes. We then organize and allow trading in a single
asset market, where each subject can take trading positions as buyers and/or sellers.9
To ensure adequate liquidity, all traders had a sufficiently large initial cash endowment.
Traders are also endowed with three units of the asset. No short selling is allowed. There
is also a bankruptcy constraint which does not allow any trader to engage in a transaction
if her cash holdings go below zero. Each trader receives payoffs at the end of the market
based on final asset holdings and cash holdings. All prices are in integers values. In state
A, each unit of the Asset pays off 100 experimental dollars at the end of the market; in
State B, each unit of the Asset pays off 0.10
There are eleven trading periods in each market, each period lasting for 50 seconds.
Trading is opened for the first trading period, and follows an open continuous double
auction procedure. Subjects can type in bids to buy and/or offers to sell as many units
of the asset as they want subject to the liquidity and short-sale constraints. When a bid
or offer is entered, it immediately shows up on the public bid and offer book, which is
displayed in the center of each subject’s screen. Only improving bids and offers could be
made, and only the most recent current bid and offer are active. Subjects can accept an
bid or offer by highlighting it with the mouse and clicking the “accept” button, subject
to the bankruptcy and short sales constraints11. Subjects can also cancel an active bid or
offer they had previously posted. At the 50 second mark, all unfilled bids and offers are
8http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu/
9For more procedural details, see the sample instructions in Appendix B.
10In four of the baseline sessions, the state 2 payoffs equaled 20 instead of 0. In the analysis of data,
all transactions and prices are rescaled on a 0 to 100 scale. Experimental dollars were converted to U.S.
dollars using an exchange rate of either .01 or .02, depending on the session.
11If a bid (offer) was for multiple units, a seller (buyer) can sell to (buy from) the bidder (offerer)
multiple units by clicking “accept” repeatedly. After each acceptance, the book reduces the number of
units available for sell (buy) to (from) that bidder (seller) by one unit.
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cleared from the book, and the second 50-second trading period begins.
At the start of the second trading period, the binary public signal (Good News or
Bad News) is drawn according to the distribution conditional on the original coin flip
and publicly announced to all subjects. Holdings are carried over across periods. Trading
occurred in the second period following the same rules and procedures as in the first
period. After 50 seconds, the book is again cleared and a new public signal is drawn
and announced. This continued for 11 trading periods (until 50 seconds after the 10th
public signal had been announced). After the last trading period, the market closes, the
state of the world is revealed, and each trader’s cash on hand is credited based on final
holdings of the asset. We then proceed to open another market, with procedures identical
to the first market. The experimenter again flips a coin to determine the state, trading
screens are reset, asset endowments are reset at three units for each trader, and cash
holdings are carried over from the first market. This continues until a total of six markets
are conducted. Each subject is then paid in private the sum of their earnings in all six
markets, plus a show-up fee of $10. Each session lasted between 1.5 to 2 hours, including
instructions and payment.
The public signal is generated by rolling a die in each period as described in the
instructions (see appendix). In three of the sessions, the signal distribution corresponds
to an informativeness of q = 5
9
, and in the other three sessions, the signal informativeness
was q = 6
9
. These conditional signal distributions were explained carefully and accurately
to the subjects.
Two additional sessions with 10 traders in each were conducted using a complete
market design. In these sessions, traders were allowed to buy and sell two assets, one
which paid off in state A and the other in state B. Hence, these markets offer the oppor-
tunity for limited arbitrage, suggesting the hypothesis that speculative overpricing will be
diminished compared to the baseline sessions. Traders were endowed with three units of
each asset. In other respects, they were conducted in an identical manner as the baseline
sessions described above.
To explore the effect of the short-sale constraint on asset prices directly, we conducted
three additional sessions where markets were organized to allow traders to engage in short-
sales. Specifically, at any time the market was open, any trader was allowed to purchase
from the “bank” a safe, bundled asset consisting of one unit of asset A and one unit of
asset B at a risk-free price of 100. Traders were allowed to purchase as many units of the
safe, bundled asset as they wished subject to the cash-on-hand constraint.12 This allows
any trader who has zero Asset A holdings to engage in a strategy that mimics short-selling
12Traders could also re-sell the bundled asset back to the bank for a price of 100.
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Asset A, by purchasing the bundled asset and then unbundling it by selling off the Asset
A part. All three sessions used the signal strength q = 5
9
and there were six 11-period
markets with 12 traders in each session. The procedures were otherwise the same as the
one-asset market sessions: traders could hold units of both A and B assets, but only the
A market was open for trading. Table 1 provides a summary of the experimental design.
Session Type Signal # Mkts # Subs Period (secs)
1 One Asset 5
9
6 12 50
2 One Asset 5
9
6 12 50
3 One Asset 5
9
6 10 50
4 One Asset 6
9
6 12 50
5 One Asset 6
9
6 12 50
6 One Asset 6
9
6 10 50
7 Complete 5
9
6 10 50
8 Complete 6
9
6 10 50
9 Short Sale 5
9
6 12 50
10 Short Sale 5
9
6 12 50
11 Short Sale 5
9
6 12 50
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Sessions
5 Results
We present the results of our experiment in the following order. First, we analyze whether
there is significant overpricing in the data from the baseline sessions, and to what extent
this can be attributed to a speculative premium. We next test two related implications
of the model: asymmetric reaction to good news versus bad news and the horizon effect.
Third, we report results from our two alternative market designs, that allow inframarginal
traders, who believe prices are too high relative to their beliefs, to engage in arbitrage in
ways that were not available in the baseline design. This includes completing the market
by opening up markets for state contingent claims in both states, and explicitly allowing
short sales. Finally, we examine the dynamics of individual asset ownership from period to
period as information is gradually revealed and compare it to the theoretical predictions
about ownership dynamics.
The hypotheses generated by the model concern the trajectory of transaction prices in
the markets. The central hypotheses concern overpricing relative to the Bayesian bench-
mark, which as we showed in Section 3 is driven by two different phenomena: the valuation
component, which derives from heteogeneous current hold-to-maturity valuations; and a
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speculative component, which derives from heteogeneous future hold-to-maturity valu-
ations. Because we cannot control for or directly observe each individual trader’s θi,
measuring these two components of overpricing in our data means that of the distribution
of θi’s has to be estimated from the observed transaction prices. Before proceeding with
the estimation, we first ask simply whether, in our markets, the combined effect of the
two components produces prices that are in excess of the prices that would arise if traders
had homogeneous, Bayesian beliefs.
We then turn to speculative overpricing by estimating the speculative premium. To
do this, we estimate θmin and θmax for each session. We also obtain estimates for a model
of homogeneous beliefs by constraining θmin = θmax . This allows us to conduct a nested
test to see whether our data rejects the null hypothesis of homogeneous beliefs. This is
done separately for each session. We then use these session-by-session estimates to obtain
a quantitative measure of the implied speculative premium component of overpricing
in every trading period of every session, i.e., the difference between the price and the
valuation of the most optimistic type. This provides a direct test for the existence of
a speculative premium in our data, as well as allowing us to test the model’s specific
theoretical predictions about how the speculative premium depends on the history of
public signals. We also provide some finer tests of the implications of the theoretical
model based on heterogeneous beliefs.
5.1 Transaction Prices
5.1.1 Overpricing relative to the Bayesian benchmark
To begin our analysis, we compare asset prices to the Bayesian benchmark, that is, the
value of the asset assuming Bayesian updating (θ = 1). We calculate the median price
of all transactions in each trading period and use this as our price observation for that
trading period. For the analysis in this section of the paper, we relate prices by the
amount of information revealed. To do this, we code the history of public signals that
has been revealed up to period t by counting the number, α, of good news signals and the
number, β, of bad news signals. The observations for our analysis are aggregated at the
period level. However, for ease of presentation in this section of the analysis, we construct
an aggregate price for all periods in all markets that share the same δ. That is, we use
the median of the median transaction prices over all trading periods with the same value
of δ. The δ = 0 trading periods are further broken down into two categories, depending
on whether it was the initial trading period of a market (α = β = 0) or a later trading
period (α = β > 0).
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Signal Strength: q = 5
9
Table 2 presents the aggregate median prices for the q = 5
9
sessions, for each value of δ as well as the predicted prices for the homogeneous Bayesian
updating model. N refers to the total number of transactions that occurred at that value
of δ.
δ Median Price (N) Bayesian Price (θ = 1)
-6 37.5 (4) 20.8
-5 48.1 (4) 24.7
-4 51.2 (24) 29.1
-3 50 (52) 33.9
-2 52.5 (113) 39
-1 55.6 (182) 44.4
0 (initial period) 53.8 (136) 50
0 58.8 (148) 50
1 60 (138) 55.6
2 61.2 (58) 61
3 75.2 (24) 66.1
4 87.5 (35) 70.9
5 93.1 (7) 75.3
Table 2: Median Prices by Information Revealed (q = 5
9
)
Figure 1 plots the prices in the q = 5
9
sessions against the difference in good versus
bad news signals along with the predicted prices under the null model where all traders
Bayesian update to the common posterior after receiving each signal (i.e., no heterogene-
ity). The observed transaction prices remain above the predicted ones regardless of the
difference between good and bad news signals. Furthermore, the observed and predicted
prices under the null model are significantly different from each other according to the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p < 0.0001).13 This suggests that although the traders are re-
ceiving informative signals about the state of the world, they may be using non-Bayesian
updating heuristics. To the extent that there is heterogeneity of these heuristics, asset
prices will deviate systematically from those predicted under the assumption of perfect
Bayesian updating and lead to overpricing according to the multiple-θ model of specula-
tion.
13The Wilcoxon test assumes independence across observations. To the extent that there is some
correlation across observations in our data, the p-values we report for these tests should be treated as
a lower bound. Alternative tests with lower power (e.g., binomial test) also yield highly significant test
statistics.
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Figure 1: Median Prices versus Bayesian Predictions (q = 5
9
)
The homogeneous beliefs model predicts the price to be 50 in all periods where there
are equal pieces of good and bad news, δ = 0. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test reveals that
the median prices in these periods are significantly higher than 50 (p < 0.0001). Next, we
turn to the price in the initial period when there has been no news announcements. Under
the null model, the price in the initial period of each market should be 50, reflecting the
flat prior. This prediction does not hinge upon any assumptions about the belief updating
process. In fact, the median price is above 50 in all 18 initial periods (Wilcoxon signed-
rank: p = 0.0002). These transaction prices in the initial periods may offer the clearest
evidence of speculative trading. Since no information has been revealed, if the prices are
above 50, at least some traders must be trading based on speculation about price changes
in future periods.
Signal Strength: q = 6
9
Table 3 and Figure 2 display the aggregate median prices
for the q = 6
9
sessions. We find that observed prices follow the trajectory of predicted
Bayesian prices more closely than in the q = 5
9
sessions. However, the observed prices are
still greater than the predicted prices for nearly all δ and these differences are significant
according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p < 0.0001).
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δ Median Price (N) Bayesian Price (θ = 1)
-7 0.9 (6) 0.8
-6 2.2 (8) 1.5
-5 4.4 (2) 3
-4 10.2 (12) 5.9
-3 13.1 (30) 11.1
-2 21.9 (57) 20
-1 43.8 (80) 33.3
0 (initial period) 58.1 (110) 50
0 62.5 (98) 50
1 75 (146) 66.6
2 87.5 (88) 80
3 92.5 (53) 88.9
4 97.5 (39) 94.1
5 98.8 (5) 97
6 98.1 (8) 98.5
7 99.4 (2) 99.2
8 100 (1) 99.6
Table 3: Median Prices by Information Revealed (q = 6
9
)
Figure 2: Median Prices versus Bayesian Predictions (q = 6
9
)
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We again look at the median prices in all periods where δ = 0 and the prices are
predicted to be 50 under the null model with homogeneous Bayesian updating just as in
the q = 5
9
treatment. Here again we find that the median prices are also significantly
higher than 50 (Wilcoxon signed-rank: p < 0.0001) . The median prices in the 18 initial
periods are not as uniformly high as they were in the q = 5
9
treatment. Nevertheless,
they are still significantly higher than 50 (Wilcoxon signed-rank: p = 0.0120) with only 4
periods having a median price lower than 50 and three more periods exactly at 50.
Result 1: Prices in the one-asset market are systematically higher in all treat-
ments than equilibrium prices based on the null model of correct homogeneous
trader beliefs about q.14
5.1.2 Speculative Overpricing
In this section, we focus on a key implication of our model, speculative overpricing. We
estimate θmin and θmax from the pricing data for each session, which we then use to obtain
quantitative measures of the speculative premium as a function of the history of public
signals. We test the implications of Propositions 1 and 3 on the estimated speculative
premiums.
Estimating the Distribution of θ-types We use our transaction price data to esti-
mate the maximum and minimum θ types15 for each session using the following procedure.
Using the recursive formulae in our model described in Section 3, we can calculate the
theoretical price trajectory given any pair of values (θmin, θmax) for every sequence of sig-
nals in our data. Depending on the sequence of public signals, either the maximum θ type
or the minimum θ type will be the most optimistic traders and this is what determines
the asset price trajectories in our model. Recall that θ = 0 corresponds to a trader who
acts as if signals contain no useful information about the state, and θ = 1 corresponds
to a trader who Bayesian updates with the correct q. We now compute the equilibrium
price trajectories for all pairs of θmin = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ... and θmax = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ... such that
θmin ≤ θmax. This produces a matrix of prices that depends on α and β. Note that our
estimation procedure also allows for the constrained model of homogeneous beliefs where
14The transaction prices are also inconsistent with a model of homogeneous but incorrect beliefs about
q (i.e., homogeneous θ, but θ 6= 1). For the model with homogeneous θ < 1, prices are predicted to be be
less than the null model when δ > 0; and for the model with homogeneous θ > 1, prices are predicted to
be less than the null model when δ < 0. Both predictions are rejected in our data.
15The theory does not depend on the distribution of types except for the minimum and the maximum
θ.
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θmin = θmax. This implies a nested test for heterogeneous beliefs. With homogeneous
beliefs, there is no speculative premium.
For each possible (θmin, θmax) pair, we sum up the squared deviations of the median
price in each trading period of each market from the theoretical price for that pair.
Formally, let Pgmt be the median transacted price in trading period t of marketm of session
g. Let αgmt and βgmt denote, respectively, the number of a signals and b signals received up
to and including period t in market m of session g. Let P ∗t (αgmt, βgmt|θmin, θmax) denote
the equilibrium prices from our theoretical model. Then we define the model error as
the sum of squared deviations of the price data in session g from the theoretical model,
evaluated at parameters (θmin, θmax):
eg(θmin, θmax) =
∑
m,t
[Pgmt − P ∗t (αgmt, βgmt|θmin, θmax)]2.
The estimated parameters of the model for session g are given by
(θ̂gmin, θ̂
g
max) = arg min
0≤θmin≤θmax
{eg(θmin, θmax)}.
Both the observed and predicted price are normalized to [0, 1]. We also pooled the sessions
of each treatment together to estimate a treatment-level θ̂min and θ̂max. The results are
displayed in Table 4.16
Session q θ̂gmin, θ̂
g
max θ̂
g
min = θ̂
g
max F-stat
1 5/9 0.2, 1.7 0.6 236.1∗
2 5/9 0, 1 0.3 123.1∗
3 5/9 0, 1.8 0.3 227.3∗
pooled 5/9 0, 1.5 0.5 484.4∗
4 6/9 0.5, 1 0.9 46.6∗
5 6/9 1.1, 1.3 1.1 1.0
6 6/9 0, 1.5 0.8 131∗
pooled 6/9 0.6, 1.3 0.9 78.6∗
Table 4: Type Estimation by Session
Note: ∗ indicates homogeneous model (no speculative premium) rejected (p < 0.05)
Column 3 of Table 4 shows the estimated (θ̂gmin, θ̂
g
max) pairs. Column 4 displays the
best fitting homogeneous θ model. Column 6 contains the F test statistic for the null
hypothesis θ̂gmin = θ̂
g
max, where
16In 12 out of 396 trading periods there were no transactions. These are treated as missing data.
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F =
eg(θmin=θmax)−eg(θmin<θmax)
(n−1)−(n−2)
eg(θmin<θmax)
n−2
and n is the number of trading periods. The fit is uniformly worse for the single θ
estimations compared to the θ pair ones, suggesting that our model with heterogeneous
posterior beliefs among the traders better captures the observed price dynamics. The
homogeneous belief model is rejected at the 5% level for all sessions except one. In the
one exception, the price dynamics suggest that most of the traders’ beliefs are close to
the objective signal strength.
Some additional observations can be gleaned from the estimation results for both the
heterogeneous and homogeneous belief models. For the homogeneous belief model, θ̂imax =
θ̂imin is less than 1 for 5 of the 6 sessions. If we assumed that all traders updated their
beliefs in the same way, then the price trajectory would suggest that on average, traders
under-reacted to the information flow. On the other hand, under the heterogeneous belief
model, θ̂imax is estimated to be at least 1 for all 6 sessions. Furthermore, θ̂
i
min and θ̂
i
max
span a considerable range for most of the sessions. Given the better of fit of this model
for nearly all the sessions, the likely heterogeneity across traders, ranging from those
who react little to information to those who overreact, would have been masked by a
homogeneous belief model.17
Result 2 (Heterogeneity): We estimate significant heterogeneity in updating
rules across subjects in all sessions. The range varies across treatments, with
θ̂imax greater than or equal to 1.
17We would expect such variation within and across sessions if there is some underlying distribution
of θi in the population and we are drawing small (10 or 12) independent samples of traders from this
distribution.
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To illustrate how the observed sequences of transacted prices compare to the prices
in the estimated model with heterogeneity, Figure 3 displays price graphs of five asset
markets from four different sessions. These graphs present all the bids, offers, and trans-
actions in each market in addition to the price trajectory of our model estimates for that
session. Transacted prices appear as large dots in the graph, unaccepted bids to buy
appear as small diamonds, and unaccepted offers to sell appear as small triangles. The
estimated prices from our model appear as solid lines.
Estimating the Speculative Premium We use the session-specific θ̂gmin and θ̂
g
max to
calculate the speculative premium for each period of each session. Recall the speculative
premium is the difference between the price and the maximum valuation of the asset
among all traders which is determined by either the θmin or θmax trader depending on
the information revealed: Pt(α)− ρt(α). For each period, we determine whether the θmin
traders or the θmax traders are the marginal ones. We then calculate the maximum
valuation of the asset by these marginal traders given their θ and subtract that from the
period’s median asset price. This difference is the trading period’s speculative premium.
We then take the median of all speculative premiums in periods with the same δ. Table
5 presents the median speculative premium as a function of δ, the analogue to the price
tables 2 and 3.
We can see from Table 5 that the speculative premium is higher in periods with δ
closer to 0, with a few exceptions. This overall pattern is consistent with Proposition 1(i):
speculative overpricing should be reflected in a positive speculative premium in periods
where α < 5 and β < 5 since there are no permanent optimists. The median speculative
premium for these periods is 5.00 in the q = 5
9
treatment, 3.38 in the q = 6
9
treatment,
and 5.00 overall, all significantly positive (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 0.05). The
speculative premiums are also significantly positive across all trading periods (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test: p < 0.05) in the q = 5
9
treatment (median: 4.80), in the q = 6
9
treatment
(median: 1.89) and pooled across both treatments (median: 3.75).
Result 3 (Proposition 1(i)): The speculative premium is significantly positive
in periods with no permanent optimist. The second part of Proposition 1 states
that the speculative premium should be zero when enough good news signals (or bad news
signals) have accumulated relative to the number of periods remaining in the market
(T − t ≤ |δ|). We first test a weak form of this hypothesis, that is, the speculative
premium should be higher when T − t > |δ| than in periods where the horizon is too short
(T − t ≤ |δ|). Indeed, this is what we observe: the speculative premiums are higher on
average in periods where both α and β are less than T
2
= 5 (Table 6) and this difference
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δ q = 5
9
(N) q = 6
9
(N)
-7 -7.18 (6)
-6 -5.85 (4) -8.92 (8)
-5 3.68 (4) -10.65 (2)
-4 5.00 (24) -0.70 (12)
-3 3.34 (52) 1.09 (30)
-2 4.73 (113) 1.81 (57)
-1 5.63 (182) 10.45 (80)
0 (initial period) 3.75 (136) 8.13 (110)
0 8.75 (148) 12.50 (98)
1 2.59 (138) 3.61 (146)
2 0.27 (58) 1.11 (88)
3 -0.16 (24) 0.028 (53)
4 7.81 (35) 0.97 (39)
5 6.17 (7) 1.78 (5)
6 -0.34 (8)
7 0.15 (2)
8 0.39 (1)
Table 5: Speculative Premium by Information Revealed
is significant in both treatments. Second, a somewhat stronger prediction is that the
speculative premium should be positive if and only if both α < 5 and β < 5. Across all
periods where either α or β is greater than T
2
= 5 (T − t ≤ |δ|), the speculative premiums
are only significantly different from zero in the q = 5
9
treatment. The null hypothesis that
the speculative premiums are zero cannot be rejected for the q = 6
9
treatment or when we
pool across both information treatments. Thus, with the one exception of trading periods
when T − t ≤ |δ| in the q = 5
9
treatment, we find strong support for our hypothesis.
q = 5
9
† q = 6
9
† Pooled†
α ≥ 5 or β ≥ 5 3.19∗ 0.99 2.00
α < 5 and β < 5 5.00∗ 3.38∗ 5.00∗
Table 6: Median Speculative Premiums
∗=significantly different from 0 (p=0.05)
†=significantly lower in periods with α ≥ 5 or β ≥ 5 (p=0.05)
Result 4 (Proposition 1(ii)): The speculative premium is not significantly
different from zero in periods where either α or β is greater than T
2
= 5 (T − t ≤
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|δ|) with the exception of periods where T − t ≤ |δ| in the q = 5
9
treatment.
5.1.3 Asymmetric Pricing in Good News versus Bad News Regimes
The asymmetric price response to information in good news regimes compared to bad
news regimes is already evident in Table 2 and Figure 1. The median price never goes
below 30 for information flows in bad news regimes (δ < 0), while the price reach above
90 in good news regimes (δ ≥ 0).
The intuition behind our pricing asymmetry hypothesis (Proposition 2) is that the
marginal trader is a high-θ type in good news regimes and a low-θ type in bad news
regimes. Thus, prices react more strongly in good news regimes (δ positive) than in bad
news regimes (δ negative). If traders had homogeneous beliefs, even if the common θ were
not 1, the prices would be above the Bayesian benchmark only in good news regimes (if
θ¿1) or only in bad news regimes (if θ¡1) but not in both.
To test Proposition 2 more carefully, we run regressions to test if the price is indeed
less sensitive to bad news than to good news. The dependent variable is the deviation of
the median price from 50 in each period. This is calculated by subtracting the price from
50 if δ < 0 and subtracting 50 from the price if δ ≥ 0.18 The independent variables are
interaction terms, one between the absolute difference between a signals and b signals,
|δ|, and a dummy for this difference being negative, and another between the difference
and a dummy for a non-negative difference. We run the regression separately for each
treatment and again with the treatments pooled.
|50− P | = pi + γ1|δ| ∗ I(δ ≥ 0) + γ2|δ| ∗ I(δ < 0) + 
We hypothesize that 0 ≤ γ2 < γ1 because, from Proposition 2, the price should be
further from 50 if δ ≥ 0 than if δ < 0. Table 7 reports the regression results.
5/9∗∗ 6/9∗ Pooled∗∗
γ1 7.35 (0.74) 8.40 (1.02) 9.40 (0.56)
γ2 -2.53 (1.29) 5.45 (1.18) 1.93 (0.61)
Constant 3.10 (1.08) 11.66 (2.19) 5.85 (1.03)
Table 7: Price Reaction to Good News vs. Bad News
Note: γ1 > γ2 (
∗: p = 0.05; ∗∗: p = 0.01). Clustering by market.
We find that γ2 is significantly less than γ1 in both the separate and pooled regressions
as hypothesized (p < 0.05). When there are already at least as many a signals as b signals
18We run the same regressions with the absolute deviation from 50 as the dependent variable and the
qualitative results remain the same.
27
(δ ≥ 0), the estimated price reaction to an additional a signal (γ̂1) ranges from 7.35 to
9.40, and is significantly greater than zero in all cases (p < 0.01). In contrast, if there
are already fewer a signals than b signals (δ < 0), the estimated price reaction to an
additional b signal (γ̂2) is not significantly different from zero in the q =
5
9
treatment and
is significantly greater than 0 for the q = 6
9
treatment and for the pooled sample. We also
note that the constant is significantly greater than 0 in all the regressions, which indicates
speculative overpricing when δ = 0.
Finally, we test one additional implication of the asymmetric response hypothesis: we
compare the absolute price change when δ increases from 1 to 2 versus when δ decreases
from -1 to -2. 19 Pooled across both treatments, the absolute price change when δ changes
from 1 to 2 is 8.38 on average (N = 27). This is significantly higher than the absolute price
change when δ changes from -1 to -2 which is 5.54 on average (N = 31; Mann-Whitney:
p < 0.05).
Result 5 (Proposition 2 ): Market prices react asymmetrically to informa-
tion in Good and Bad news regimes, and this asymmetry is consistent with
the equilibrium price dynamics predicted by the heterogeneous θ updating
model.
5.1.4 The Horizon Effect
The horizon effect posits that the speculative premium is larger when there are more
periods remaining in the market, provided there is not yet a permanent optimist. Formally,
when T − t > |δ| (i.e., for our markets, if α < 5 and β < 5), the speculative premium is
weakly increasing in T − t for any fixed value of δ.
To test Proposition 3, we first construct a horizon measure, which we specify as
the number of trading periods that remain in the market; thus, it ranges from 10 for
the initial period to 0 for the last period. For each treatment, we regress the estimated
speculative premium on the horizon variable, controlling for the difference in the pieces of
good versus bad news, δ. We report the results separately for δ ≤ 0 and δ ≥ 0, because
of the asymmetry of prices depending on whether δ is greater or less than zero. These
regressions were restricted to the periods where α < 5 and β < 5 because our theory only
predicts the horizon effect for these periods. The regression coefficients are reported in
Table 8.
According to Proposition 3, the coefficient on T−t in the regression should be greater
than or equal to zero. We find that the three of the four coefficients on the horizon variable
19There are too few observations to compare δ = 2 to δ = 3 and δ = −2 to δ = −3 (or higher levels of
δ).
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δ ≥ 0 δ ≤ 0
q = 5
9
q = 6
9
q = 5
9
q = 6
9
T − t -0.45 (0.23) -1.22∗ (0.51) -0.42 (0.33) -0.066 (1.18)
|δ| -4.06∗∗ (0.58) -5.13∗∗ (1.44) -1.47∗ (0.67) -5.00∗ (2.11)
Constant 10.54∗∗ (1.98) 18.60∗∗ (5.65) 9.99∗∗ (2.83) 16.75 (12.31)
N 84 96 108 82
Table 8: The Horizon Effect in Speculative Premiums for Periods where δ ≥ 0, α < 5 and
β < 5
significantly different from 0 (∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗: p < 0.01). Clustering by market.
are not significantly different from zero, and the one significant coefficient has the opposite
sign as predicted by Proposition 3. The coefficients on |δ| are all significant and negative,
indicating that the speculative premium is smaller the further the posterior belief is from
0.5. This seems intuitive, since the speculative premium arises because of the possibility
that the identity of the most optimistic trader may switch at some future date. The
probability of such a switch is decreasing in δ if δ > 0 and increasing in δ if δ < 0.
Furthermore, the switch, if it occurs, would happen closer to the horizon the larger is |δ|,
controlling for T − t.
Result 6 (Proposition 3 ): We find no significant horizon effect, except in one
case where the speculative premium is significantly increasing in t.
5.2 Complete Markets and Relaxing the Short-Sale Constraint
5.2.1 Complete Markets: Both Assets Traded
We compare the price trajectories in the two markets in the complete markets environment
to those in the incomplete market environment where only one asset is traded. The prices
in the complete markets do reach substantially lower levels, in the 20s and 30s when
δ < 0, which happens rarely in the one-asset sessions. This suggests that having both
assets available to trade has allowed for some degree of incomplete arbitrage against the
speculation. However, we still observe prices significantly above 50 (Wilcoxon signed-
rank: p < 0.0001) in periods where δ = 0, a median price of 57 for Asset A and 59
for Asset B. Furthermore, these above-value (Wilcoxon signed-rank: p = 0.0002) median
prices are also observed in the initial periods when no information has been revealed in
both markets, 56 for Asset A and 57 for Asset B.
Observing prices in complete markets provides an opportunity for an especially simple
test of the overpricing hypothesis, by comparing the sum of the two assets’ prices to 100
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in any trading period. Proposition 2 implies that the sum should be greater than the no-
arbitrage price of 100 if α < 5 and β < 5. The alternative hypothesis, based on arbitrage
pricing, is that the sum of the two prices should not be significantly different from 100.
δ q = 5
9
q = 6
9
-6 100 (16)
-5 79 (27)
-4 99 (35)
-3 136 (8) 115 (36)
-2 132 (26) 120 (35)
-1 128 (34) 91 (48)
0 (initial period) 129 (73) 104 (65)
0 132 (46) 106 (38)
1 132 (77) 108 (24)
2 124 (72) 108 (15)
3 129 (43) 115 (6)
4 130 (11) 110 (6)
5 132 (5)
6 101 (2)
Table 9: Sum of Median Prices in Complete Markets Sessions (N=number of transactions)
It is evident from Table 9 that in nearly all cases (19 out of 23) the two asset prices
sum to greater than 100. In the q = 5
9
market, it occurs in all 10 cases. The effect is
somewhat muted in the q = 6
9
treatment, where we observe prices in excess of the no-
arbitrage price in 9 of 13 cases. Of possible interest is the observation that all of the
exceptions arise when δ < 0 and q = 6
9
. Also worth noting is the fact that the sum of the
prices sometimes exceeds 100 by a large amount. In fact, the sum of the prices is 15% or
more above the no-arbitrage prices more than half of the time (13 out of 23 cases). The
sum of prices is significantly greater than 100 in each treatment and pooled across both
treatments (p < 0.0001 for q = 5
9
treatments and both treatments pooled; p = 0.0226 for
q = 6
9
).
Result 7 (Complete Markets): Prices in the two-asset markets are systemat-
ically higher than no arbitrage prices. That is, the sum of the prices across
the two markets is greater than 100 for nearly all values of δ. This is observed
for both treatments.
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5.2.2 Relaxing the Short-Sale Constraint
Table 10 presents the aggregate prices for each value of δ for the three sessions in which
the short-sale constraint was relaxed as well as the predicted prices for the homogeneous
Bayesian updating model. For 5 out of the 11 values of δ, the median price is actually
below the Bayesian price.
δ Median Price (N) Bayesian Price (θ = 1)
-6 14.25 (42) 20.8
-5 22.75 (60) 24.7
-4 34 (56) 29.1
-3 44.5 (121) 33.9
-2 41.75 (181) 39
-1 49 (235) 44.4
0 (initial period) 51.5 (213) 50
0 52 (302) 50
1 55 (310) 55.6
2 65 (191) 61
3 64 (82) 66.1
4 70 (70) 70.9
Table 10: Median Prices in Markets with Short Sales (N=number of transactions)
Figure 4 shows the disparity between the prices in the sessions with and without
the option of buying and selling asset bundles. The median prices in the sessions with
a relaxed short-sale constraint are significantly lower than the baseline markets (Mann-
Whitney: p = 0.0037) . In fact, the median price is lower for every value of δ except for
δ = 3. Allowing short sales substantially reduces speculative overpricing.20
20Even though the median prices in these sessions are very close to the Bayesian prices, statistically
they are still slightly higher (Wilcoxon signed-rank: p < 0.0001).
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Figure 4: Median Prices in Short Sales sessions versus Bayesian Predictions and Markets
with No Short Sales
Result 8 (Short Sales): Allowing short sales significantly reduces the level of
overpricing. Prices are only slightly higher than Bayesian prices.
5.3 Asset Allocations
In addition to properties of equilibrium asset prices, our model also suggests some hy-
potheses about the dynamics of asset ownership among the traders as a function of the
information revealed. We use individual trading data to classify subjects into types based
on how their individual holdings vary with δ. One implication of our model for ownership
dynamics is that different traders hold the assets over time depending on the pieces of
information revealed up to that point. Specifically, when more signals of good news than
bad news have been revealed (δ > 0), the θmax traders are the optimists and should be net
buyers of the asset, while everyone else should sell the asset. On the other hand, when
more signals of bad news than good news have been revealed (δ < 0), the θmin traders
are the optimists and should hold the asset. To investigate these predicted switches, we
compare the distribution of asset holdings across traders in periods where δ > 0 to the
holdings distribution in periods where δ < 0.
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Treatment Always Sell Gullible Skeptical Always Buy Overall
5/9 10 9 10 5 34
6/9 10 8 9 7 34
Total 20 17 19 12 68
Table 11: Distribution of Trader Types
We categorize each trader into one of behavioral types based on whether his/her net
holdings (end-of-period holdings minus initial endowment) is positive or negative. For
each trader, we do this separately for δ > 0 periods and δ < 0 periods.21 For each of
these two ranges of δ, a trader is counted as having zero net holdings if a trader’s mean
net holdings are less than the standard error of that trader’s net holdings over that range
of δ. Otherwise the trader is counted as having either positive or negative net holdings
over that range of δ. Traders with positive net holdings when δ > 0 and negative or zero
net holdings when δ < 0, or zero net holdings when δ > 0 and negative net holdings
when δ < 0 are categorized as Gullible or θmax types because they are net buyers only
when there is more good news than bad news. Traders with positive holdings when δ < 0
and negative or zero net holdings when δ > 0, or zero net holdings when δ < 0 and
negative net holdings when δ > 0 are categorized as Skeptical or θmin types because they
are net buyers only when there is more bad news than good news. Always Sell types have
negative or zero net holdings in both δ > 0 and δ < 0 periods, and these correspond in
the model to traders with intermediate values of θ, with θmin < θ < θmax.
Table 11 summarizes the distribution of trader types across treatments. The vast
majority of traders (82.4%) in our markets are categorized as Gullible, Skeptical, or Always
Sell types, which is consistent with the heterogeneous beliefs model. There is a small
residual category of traders who do not fall in either of these three categories, and we
refer to them as Noise Traders. These few traders, who have non-negative and sometimes
positive net holdings for both ranges of δ, are difficult to reconcile with the existing model.
Result 9 (Trader Types): Most traders are classified in one of the three cat-
egories: fickle, skeptical, and always sell, corresponding to high, low, and
intermediate values of θ, respectively.
21Periods where δ = 0 are not included in the analysis because the model makes no prediction about
asset holdings in these periods.
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6 Conclusion
We study pricing in asset markets with public information flows and the short-sale con-
straint when traders have heterogeneous beliefs. We analyze a simple parsimonious model
of such heterogeneity with a single parameter that indexes whether a trader overweights
or underweights new information relative to Bayesian updating. Building on Harrison and
Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996), this model generates equilibrium price dynamics that
exhibit two key properties: speculative overpricing and asymmetric response to good and
bad news.
We report data from a series of laboratory markets for an asset whose terminal payoff
is contingent upon an unknown state of the world. At regular intervals during the trading,
a sequence of ten informative but imperfect signals are publicly revealed to the traders
at regular intervals. We find asset prices consistently above what would be predicted by
a model of homogeneous Bayesian updating to a common posterior. Theoretically, an
important component of these high prices is speculative overpricing, which takes the form
of a speculative premium equal to the difference between the equilibrium price and the
maximum hold-to-maturity valuation among all traders. Traders are willing to pay more
for the asset than their “true” valuation as long as there is a positive probability that
some other trader may value it even more after some future sequence of signals.
We also document an asymmetric price response to information in good news versus
bad news regimes in that prices respond more strongly to information when good news
has outweighed bad news. This arises in the model as a direct consequence of belief
heterogeneity, because low-θ type traders who update too conservatively have the most
optimistic valuation in bad news regimes; this valuation then determines the price, thus
dampening the effect of information. The high-θ types, who over-react to public infor-
mation, have the highest valuation when there has been more good news than bad news,
thus prices reflect this over-reaction.
To measure the speculative component of overpricing and to test explicitly for the
presence of belief heterogeneity, we estimate the maximum and minimum value of θ in each
session and find significant heterogeneity of beliefs in all but one of the baseline sessions.
The estimated distribution of θ types implies a quantitative measure of the speculative
premium in each period of each market. We find that the estimated speculative premium is
significantly positive in periods with no permanent optimist, as predicted. In contrast, the
estimated speculative premium is significantly lower when there is a permanent optimist
and is usually not significantly different from zero.
Next, we ask whether the speculative overpricing can be curbed institutionally. To
answer this end, we ran additional sessions where we manipulated the market organization
34
in two different ways: (a) by instituting complete markets with the full set of two Arrow-
Debreu securities being traded in parallel, one market for asset A and one for asset B;
and (b) instituting a market where short sales are allowed. In the complete market
environment, significant overpricing persists: the transaction prices of the two assets add
up to more than the certain payoff of holding one unit of each asset, 100. Just as in the
one-market sessions, we observe prices that are significantly higher than 50 in the initial
periods when no information has been revealed as well as in periods where the number of
good news signals equals the number of bad news signals.
In contrast, when the short-sale constraint is removed, prices are significantly reduced
and are close to the Bayesian benchmark. Overall, our results demonstrate that the
short-sale constraint can be an important factor leading to speculative overpricing in
asset markets, which may have implications for policies that explicitly limit the extent to
which traders may engage in short selling.
Finally, the model also generates predictions about patterns of asset ownership that
depend on the sequence of public signals. To study the predictions about individual
asset ownership, we categorize traders into several categories depending on whether their
trading behavior is consistent with being are a high θ−type (net buyer with good news,
net seller with bad news), a low-θ type (net buyer with bad news, net seller with good
news), or an intermediate-θ type (net seller). Most traders’ net holdings patterns are
consistent with the heterogeneous-θ model, with two caveats: most traders do not reduce
their holdings to exactly zero when they are net sellers; and a few traders average positive
net holdings in both good news regimes and bad news regimes.
We conclude that the heterogeneous beliefs model of asset pricing is broadly sup-
ported by our data. Methodologically, the “public information flow” asset market design
used here is an innovation to laboratory markets that makes it possible to address impor-
tant theoretical questions about asset pricing dynamics. There are a variety of different
directions to take this work and our findings are suggestive of some interesting theoretical
and experimental extensions. On the theoretical side, one could enrich the type space
by considering multidimensional time-dependent types where θit varies over time. One
could also consider alternative specifications of belief heterogeneity. It would be useful to
extend both the Morris model and our model to include risk averse traders or to incorpo-
rate private information. In principle, one would expect the qualitative properties of the
dynamic trajectory of asset prices (speculative premium, asymmetry, and horizon effects)
to continue to hold in these more general models, but the holdings predictions would not
be as extreme. However, until these difficult theoretical problems are resolved, we leave
this as a conjecture.
35
References
[1] Anderson, M. and S. Sunder (1995): “Professional Traders as Intuitive Bayesians”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 64, 185–202.
[2] Asparouhova E., Bossaerts, P., Eguia, J. and W. R. Zame (2009): “Cognitive Biases,
Ambiguity Aversion and Asset Pricing in Financial Markets” Working Paper.
[3] Biais, B. and P. Bossaerts (1998): “Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty
Contest” Review of Economic Studies, 65, 307-340.
[4] Bossaerts, P., Plott, C. R., and W. R. Zame (2007): “Prices and Portfolio Choices
in Financial Markets: Theory, Econometrics, Experiments” Econometrica, 75, 993-
1038.
[5] Camerer, C. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[6] El-Gamal, M. A. and D. M. Grether (1995): “Are People Bayesian? Uncovering
Behavioral Strategies” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90, 1137-
1145.
[7] Forsythe, R., Palfrey, T. R. and C. R. Plott (1982): “Asset Valuation in an Experi-
mental Market” Econometrica, 50, 537-568.
[8] Forsythe, R., Palfrey, T. R. and C. R. Plott (1984): “Futures Markets and Informa-
tion Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination” Journal of Finance, 39, 955-981.
[9] Friedman, D., Harrison, G. W. and J. W. Salmon (1984): “The Informational Effi-
ciency of Experimental Asset Markets” Journal of Political Economy, 92, 349-408.
[10] Goeree, J., Palfrey, T. R., Rogers, B. W., and R. McKelvey (2007): “Self-Correcting
Information Cascades” Review of Economic Studies, 74, 733-762.
[11] Grossman, S. J. (1976): “On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where
Traders Have Diverse Information” Journal of Finance, 31, 573-585.
[12] Grossman, S. J. and J. E. Stiglitz (1980): “On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets” American Economic Review, 70(3), 393-408.
[13] Harris, M. and A. Raviv (1993) ”Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race.” Review
of Financial Studies, 6(3):473-506.
36
[14] Harrison, J. M. and D. M. Kreps (1978): “Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock
Market with Heterogeneous Expectations”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, 323–
336.
[15] Miller, E. (1977): “Risk, Uncertainty and Divergence of Opinion” Journal of Finance,
32, 1151-1168.
[16] Morris, S. (1996): “Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 111, 1111-1133.
[17] Ottaviani, M. and P. N. Sorensen (2007): “Aggregation of Information and Beliefs
in Prediction Markets” Working Paper.
[18] Plott, C. R., and S. Sunder (1982): “Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets
with Insider Information: An Application of Rational Expectations Models” Journal
of Political Economy, 90, 663–698.
[19] Plott, C. R., and S. Sunder (1988): “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of
Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets,” Econometrica, 56, 1085–1118.
[20] Porter, D. P. and V. L. Smith (2003): “Stock Market Bubbles in the Laboratory”
The Journal of Behavioral Finance, 4, 7-20.
[21] Radner, R. (1979): “Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the
Information Revealed by Prices” Econometrica, 47(3), 655-678.
[22] Scheinkman, J. A. and W. Xiong (2003): “Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles”
Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1183-1219.
[23] Smith, V.L., G. Suchanek, and A. Williams (1988): “Bubbles, Crashes, and En-
dogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets” Econometrica, 56(5),
1119-1151.
[24] Sunder, S. (1995): “Experimental Asset markets: A Survey” Handbook of Experi-
mental Economics, A. Roth and J. Kagel (eds), Princeton University Press: New
Jersey.
7 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
The posterior belief that $ = A for traders of type θ, given a sequence of Good and
Bad News announcements (α, β = t− α), is
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ραit(θ) =
qαθ(1− q)βθ
qαθ(1− q)βθ + qβθ(1− q)αθ
Since q > 0.5, θmax = arg max
i∈I
{ραit(θi)} if δ > 0, and θmin = arg max
i∈I
{ραit(θi)} if δ < 0.
Traders with the highest θ place the greatest weight on signals so their posterior for state
A will be highest of all traders when α > β. On the other hand, traders with the lowest
θ underweight the signals the most so their posterior for state A will be highest of the
traders when β > α. When α − β = δ = 0, then ρit(α) = p = 0.5 ∀i, i.e., all traders’
beliefs coincide, and every trader is a current optimist.
To prove (i) consider period t and any sequence such that |δ| + t < T . Thus, if all
future signals are a-signals (i.e., st+1 = ... = sT = a) then the current optimist at period
T is a θmax trader. Similarly, if all future signals are b-signals (i.e., st+1 = ... = sT = b)
then the current optimist at period T is a θmintrader. Therefore, there is no permanent
optimist at period t. That is, there is no permanent optimist at t if and only if it is
uncertain which trader type will be the current optimist in the final period, T .
To complete the proof, we need to show that the speculative premium is positive.
Suppose without loss of generality, that in period t there has been a sequence of signals
{s1, ..., st} with 0 ≤ δ < T − t so a θmax trader is a current optimist. (The argument is the
same for the case of 0 ≤ −δ < T − t and θmin is a current optimist.) Let t′ = t+1+α−β.
Note that t′ ≤ T since α−β+ t < T . Consider all sequences of signals st′t = {st+1, ..., st′}.
For exactly one such sequence, st
′
t = (b, ..., b), the sequence with all b signals, a θmax trader
is not a current optimist at t′. (Instead, a θmin trader will be the current optimist.) The
equilibrium price following this sequence is just Pt′(α). Because θmax is not a current
optimist at t′ for this sequence, it implies that Pt′(α) > ραt′(θmax). For all other sequences
st
′
t 6= (b, ..., b), a θmax trader is still a current optimist at t′. Let z(st′t ) denote the θmax
trader’s belief at t that the exact sequence of signals from period t+ 1 to period t′ will be
st
′
t , and denote by α˜(s
t′
t ) the total number of a signals out of all signals s1, ..., st′ , given
that α of the first t signals were a signals. Thus, the θmax trader’s belief at t
′ that the
state of the world is A equals ρ
α˜(st
′
t )
t′ (θmax). Because θmax is a current optimist at t
′, it
implies that Pt′(α˜(s
t′
t )) ≥ ρα˜(s
t′
t )
t′ (θmax) for all s
t′
t 6= (b, ..., b). However, by the recursive
definition of prices, and because θmax is a current optimist for every period from t to t
′−1
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(since we constructed t′ = t+ 1 + α− β), the current price is given by
Pt(α) = z(b, ..., b)Pt′(α) +
∑
st
′
t 6=(b,...,b)
z(st
′
t )Pt′(α˜(s
t′
t ))
≥ z(b, ..., b)Pt′(α) +
∑
st
′
t 6=(b,...,b)
z(st
′
t )ρ
α˜(st
′
t )
t′ (θmax)
> z(b, ..., b)ραt′(θmax) +
∑
st
′
t 6=(b,...,b)
z(st
′
t )ρ
α˜(st
′
t )
t′ (θmax)
= ραt (θmax).
The last line follows from the fact that, given the updating formulas ραt (θmax) =
∑
st
′
t
z(st
′
t )ρ
α˜(st
′
t )
t′ (θmax).
Hence Pt(α) > ρ
α
t (θmax), and there is a positive speculative premium when there is no
permanent optimist.
We now move to the proof of (ii). If at some t we have α − β ≥ T − t, then α ≥ β
and hence ραt (θmax) ≥ ραit(θi) ∀i. Furthermore for all t′ = t + 1, ..., T and all possible
sequences of signals {st+1, ..., st′}, α ≥ t′ − T2 ≥ t′ − α = β, θmax will be the current
optimist: ρθmaxt′ (α) ≥ ρit′(α) ∀i. Thus a θmax trader is a permanent optimist at t following
any sequence of signals {s1, ..., st} such that |s ∈ {s1, ..., st}|s = a}| = α ≥ T2 . By a
similar argument a θmin trader is a permanent optimist at t following any sequence of
signals {s1, ..., st} such that |s ∈ {s1, ..., st}|s = b}| ≥ T2 .
To complete the proof of (ii), let τ index the number of periods left until the end
of the market. We prove by induction on τ that if θmax is a permanent optimist at t,
then for all possible continuation sequences of signals up to period T − τ (i.e., for all
α′ = α, α+ 1, ..., α+T − t− τ), Pτ (α′) = ρα′τ (θmax) τ = 0, ..., T − t. First, note that this is
trivially true for τ = 0 since this means t = T and so it is the last period. The last period
price is given by PT (α
′) = ρT (α
′) = ρα
′
T (θmax). The last holds because θmax is a permanent
optimist at t and α′ ≥ α ≥ T
2
. Next we show that if 0 < τ < T − t and PT−τ (α′) =
ρα
′
T−τ (θmax) for all α
′ = α, α + 1, ..., α + T − t− τ then PT−(τ+1)(α′) = ρα′T−(τ+1)(θmax) for
all α′ = α, α+ 1, ..., α+ T − t− (τ + 1). Fix some α′ ∈ {α, α+ 1, ..., α+ T − t− (τ + 1)}.
By definition, in period T − (τ + 1), the equilibrium price is
PT−(τ+1)(α′) = ϕT−(τ+1)(α′)PT−τ (α′ + 1) + (1− ϕT−(τ+1)(α′))PT−τ (α′)
= ϕT−(τ+1)(α′)ρα
′+1
T−τ (θmax) + (1− ϕT−(τ+1)(α′))ρα
′
T−τ (θmax)
= ρα
′
T−(τ+1)(θmax)
39
Proof of Proposition 2
As before, let τ index the number of periods left until the end of the market. We again
prove the result by induction on τ . First we show the proposition is true for τ = 0 and
τ = 1. Note that since α > t
2
, ρ∗t (α) = ρ
θmax
t (α) because δ > 0. Similarly, ρ
∗
t (t − α) =
ρθmint (t− α) > ρθmaxt (t− α). Since ρθmaxt (α) + ρθmaxt (t− α) = 1, ρθmint (t− α) > 1− ρθmaxt (α).
If τ = 0 or 1, t ≥ T − 1. Thus, α > t
2
implies α ≥ T
2
. By Proposition 1, if α ≥ T
2
then
Pt(α) = ρ
∗
t (α) and Pt(t− α) = ρ∗t (t− α). Therefore
Pt(t− α) = ρθmint (t− α)
> (1− ρθmaxt (α)) = (1− Pt(α)).
Note that given the definition of τ , if τ corresponds to T − t, then τ + 1 corresponds
to T − t−1. To complete the proof, letting t = T − τ, we show that for any T −2 > τ > 1
and for all t > α > t
2
, 1 − Pt(α) < Pt(t − α) implies 1 − Pt−1(α) < Pt−1(t − 1 − α). By
the equilibrium pricing equation:
Pt−1(α) = ϕt−1(α)Pt(α + 1) + (1− ϕt−1(α))Pt(α)
= ϕθmaxt−1 (α)Pt(α + 1) + (1− ϕθmaxt−1 (α))Pt(α).
The second line follows because δ > 0. The equilibrium pricing equation after a sequence
with equal number of signals (t − 1) but the numbers for the pieces of Good News and
Bad News reversed is
Pt−1(t− 1− α) = ϕt−1(t− 1− α)Pt(t− α)
+ (1− ϕt−1(t− 1− α))Pt(t− 1− α)
= ϕθmint−1 (t− 1− α)Pt(t− α)
+ (1− ϕθmint−1 (t− 1− α))Pt(t− 1− α).
The second line is due to the fact that t − 1 − α < t
2
, so the number of a signals is less
than the number of b signals.
Because the proposition is assumed to be true for τ = T − t, we have 1−Pt(α+ 1) <
Pt(t− (α + 1)) = Pt(t− 1− α) and 1− Pt(α) < Pt(t− α). Thus
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1− Pt−1(α) = ϕθmaxt−1 (α)[1− Pt(α + 1)]
+ (1− ϕθmaxt−1 (α))[1− Pt(α)]
< ϕθmaxt−1 (α)Pτ (t− 1− α) + (1− ϕθmaxt−1 (α))Pt(t− α)
< (1− ϕθmint−1 (t− 1− α))Pτ (t− 1− α) + ϕθmint−1 (t− 1− α)Pt(t− α)
= Pt−1(t− 1− α)
because Pτ (t− 1−α) < Pt(t−α) and ϕθmaxt−1 (α) > 1−ϕθmint−1 (t− 1−α), the latter following
from θmax > θmin.
Proposition 3 Proof
Again τ indexes the number of periods left until the end of the market. We prove by
induction that piT−τ (α) − piT−τ−2(α − 1) ≤ 0 for all τ = 0, ..., T − 2 and for all α =
1, ..., T − τ − 1.
We first show that this is true for τ = 0. By Proposition 1, piτ=0(α) = piT (α) = 0 and
piT−τ−2(α− 1) = piT−2(α− 1) ≥ 0. Thus piT−τ (α)− piT−τ−2(α− 1) ≥ 0 when τ = 0.
Note that given the definition of τ , if τ corresponds to t, then τ+1 corresponds to t−1.
To complete the proof, letting t = T − τ > 2, we need to show that if pit(α) ≤ pit−2(α− 1)
for all α = 1, ..., t − 1, then pit−1(α) ≤ pit−3(α − 1) for all α = 1, ..., t − 2. To prove this,
pick any α ∈ {1, ..., t− 2}. We have:
pit−1(α) = ϕ∗t−1(α)[pit(α + 1) + ρ
∗
t (α + 1)]
+ (1− ϕ∗t−1(α))[pit(α) + ρ∗t (α)]− ρ∗t−1(α)
= pit(α) + ρ
∗
t (α)− ρ∗t−1(α)
+ ϕ∗t−1(α)[pit(α + 1)− pit(α) + ρ∗t (α + 1)− ρ∗t (α)].
while the speculative premium for a sequence with the same δ but two more periods left
before the end of the market, pit−3(α− 1), is
pit−3(α− 1) = ϕ∗t−3(α− 1)[pit−2(α) + ρ∗t−2(α)]− ρ∗t−3(α− 1)
+ (1− ϕ∗t−3(α− 1))[pit−2(α− 1) + ρ∗t−2(α− 1)]
= pit−2(α− 1) + ρ∗t−2(α− 1)− ρ∗t−3(α− 1)
+ ϕ∗t−3(α− 1)[pit−2(α)− pit−2(α− 1) + ρ∗t−2(α)− ρ∗t−2(α− 1)].
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We now calculate the difference between these two speculative premiums, pit−3(α −
1)−pit−1(α). A number of terms cancel out in this difference because ρ∗t (α) = ρ∗t−2(α−1),
ρ∗t−1(α) = ρ
∗
t−3(α − 1), ρ∗t (α + 1) = ρ∗t−2(α), and ϕ∗t−1(α) = ϕ∗t−3(α − 1) = ϕ˜∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Thus we are left with
pit−3(α− 1)− pit−1(α) =(1− ϕ˜∗)(pit−2(α− 1)− pit(α))
+ ϕ˜∗(pit−2(α)− pit(α + 1)).
We know that pit−2(α − 1) − pit(α) ≥ 0 and pit−2(α) − pit(α + 1) ≥ 0 by the induction
hypothesis. Therefore, since ϕ˜∗ ∈ (0, 1), we get pit−3(α− 2)− pit−1(α− 1) ≥ 0.
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Appendix B: Online Supplementary Material
Sample Instructions
You are going to participate in a market where you trade a financial asset that pays off
real money. The market is divided into eleven 50-second trading periods. The asset you
will be trading has a value that depends on the flip of a coin before the market opens. If
the coin comes up heads, then each unit of the asset that you hold at the end of the last
trading period of the market pays off 100 Experimental dollars. If the coin comes up tails,
then each unit of the asset pays off 20 Experimental dollars. We will call it a High Payoff
State if the coin comes up heads and a Low Payoff State if the coin comes up tails. Your
earnings in the market come from two sources. One source is these payments you receive
at the end of the last trading period for your final asset holdings. The second source of
earnings (or losses) comes from buying and selling units of the asset while the market is
open.
Each of you begins the first trading period with three units of the asset. You will also
start with an initial cash holding of 800 experimental dollars which is a loan. You are
allowed to sell units of the asset only if you have some units to sell. You are allowed to buy
units of the asset only if you have enough cash holdings to pay for the purchase. When
you sell a unit, your cash holdings increase by the transaction price. When you buy a
unit, your cash holdings decrease by the transaction price. At the end of the last trading
period, any payoffs for holding units of the asset will be added to your cash holdings.
Remember, those units pay off 100 experimental dollars/unit in a High Payoff State and
20 in a Low Payoff State. Also, the 800 Experimental dollars loan will be subtracted from
your total earnings at the end of the experiment.
At 50-second intervals you will receive a News Announcement that gives you some
information about the Payoff State. To do this, we will roll a die. In the High Payoff
state, if the die roll was a 1, 2, 3, or 4, then the News Announcement is “Good News”.
Otherwise the News Announcement is “Bad News”. In the Low Payoff State, if the die
roll was a 1, 2, 3, or 4, then the News Announcement is “Bad News”. Otherwise, the
News Announcement is “Good News”. Therefore, Good News is twice as likely as Bad
News in the High Payoff State. Bad News is twice as likely as Good News in the Low
Payoff State. News Announcements are made at the end of each trading period.
We will now start the program and explain how to use the computers. Please click
on the icon pw2 and when prompted, type in your first and last name and press submit.
Then wait for everyone to finish connecting to the server.
The first screen tells you to wait while I flip a coin to determine the payoff state for
the market, and enter it into the computer. [coin flip] The coin came up so the Payoff
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State is . This brings up the next screen. Please note that you do not receive a News
Announcement until the end of the first trading period. Please click OK. After everyone
has done this, the trading screen appears and the first trading period begins. Please do
not use your computers yet, but pay attention carefully while I explain how you trade.
[Sequence of screens to show trading. Go over the regions of the trading screens and
explain how to make bids, offers, cancel, etc.]
Trading occurs when one trader makes a bid to buy or offer to sell and another trade
accepts that bid or offer. If you wish to buy a unit of the asset, you may place a bid to
buy that unit by specifying a price in the box next to bid and then pressing bid. All bids
and offers must be positive integers up to 100. Everyone in the room will see that you
have placed that bid. If anyone wishes to sell to you at your bid price, they can click to
accept your bid. If that happens, a transaction takes place, and you will have bought
one unit of the asset from the seller who accepted your bid. Your cash holdings decrease
by the bid price, and your asset holding increase by one unit. The seller’s cash holdings
increase by the price, and their asset holdings decrease by one unit. Similarly, if you wish
to sell a unit of the asset, you may place an offer to sell that unit by entering a price in
the box next to offer and then pressing offer. Everyone in the room will see your offer
price. If anyone wishes to buy from you at that price, they can accept your offer. If that
happens, a transaction is completed, and you have sold one unit of the asset to the buyer
who accepted your offer. Your cash holdings increase by the offer price, and your asset
holding decrease by one unit. The buyer’s cash holdings decrease by your offer price, and
their asset holding increase by one unit.
You may have at most one bid or offer on the market at one time. If you have an
outstanding bid and would like to make an offer instead, you must cancel it before you
can make an offer. Similarly if you have an outstanding offer, you must cancel it if you
want to make a bid. The market uses an improvement rule. If there is an active bid to
buy on the screen, any new bid to replace it must higher. If there is an active offer to sell
on the screen, any new offer must be lower. Whenever an improving bid or offer is made,
the previous bid or offer is automatically cancelled and the new one becomes the active
bid or offer. If the current bid is accepted by a seller, then there are no active bids, so
the next bid can be any amount from 1 to 100. Similarly, if the current offer is accepted
by a buyer, then there is no active offer. Also, there is no active offer if the current offer
is cancelled and no active bid if the current bid is cancelled. The current bid and offer
will be canceled automatically at the end of each trading period. You may cancel your
own current bid or offer at any time by clicking on it and pressing cancel. You may also
replace it with an improving bid or offer simply by entering the new bid or offer.
The first trading period has ended. I will now roll a die. The die comes up a and
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recall the Payoff State was so the News Announcement is “”. If the Payoff State had
been , the News Announcement would be “”. Explain the history panel then when
the period ends, explain the rest of history panel.
We will now have a short practice market with three 50-second trading periods. You
will not be paid for this practice market. It is only to help you learn how to use the trading
screen. At the beginning of the practice market, you will begin with 800 Experimental
dollars and 3 units of the asset. You will receive the first News Announcement after the
first 50-sec trading period. Are there any questions?
For this experiment, we will have 6 markets, which are completely independent of
each other. We will now proceed to the first market. After the 11 trading periods of the
first market are over, we will open a new market that will also have 11 trading periods.
The rules will be the same for every market but we will flip a coin at the beginning of
each market to determine the payoff state for that market. If the coin comes up heads, it
is a High Payoff State and if it comes up tails, it is a Low Payoff State.
You must remember the following important things.
• At the beginning of the first market you start with 800 Experimental dollars and 3
units of the asset. The 800 is a loan that will be subtracted from your final earnings
at the end of the experiment.
• Each market will consist of 11 50-sec trading periods. You will receive a News
Announcement at the end of each trading period.
• Each unit of the asset pays off 100 experimental dollars/unit in a High Payoff State
and 20 in a Low Payoff State.
• Good News is twice as likely as Bad News in the High Payoff State. Bad News is
twice as likely as Good News in the Low Payoff State. News Announcements are
made at the end of each trading period.
• Different markets may have different Payoff States, depending on the coin flip at
the beginning of the market.
• The units of the asset you hold at the end of a market do not carry over to the next
market. They expire at the end of a market. You will always start with exactly
three units of the asset at the beginning of each market.
• Your cash holdings DO carry over to the next market.
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If you have any questions from now on, please raise your hand and I will come to
your computer station and answer your question in private.
[after end of first market]
Remember, your cash holdings will be carried over to the second market and cash
holdings will be carried over from market to market until the end of the experiment.
However, your units of the asset do not carry over. We will give each of you exactly 3
units of the asset to start with in market 2.
[after end of last market]
We have now completed the experiment. Please note that the 800 loan has been
subtracted from your earnings. We will pay you the sum of your earnings in the markets
plus your show-up fee of $10.00. We will now pay each of you in private in the next room.
Please take all belongings with you when you leave to receive payment. You are under no
obligation to reveal your earnings to the other players. Please remain in your seat until
we call you to be paid. Please leave the dividers pulled out. Do not talk or socialize with
the other participants or use cell phones or computers. Thank you for your patience.
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